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      This thesis focuses on Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is a United States federal law that 
sets new or expanded requirements for all U.S. public companies. Section 404 aims to ensure 
that all public companies have effective internal controls.  Section 404 is not applied 
uniformly across different filers. This thesis focuses on the analyses of small companies as 
these companies, i.e. non-accelerated filers, got exemption from Section 404 (b), which 
requires a publicly-held company’s auditor to attest to, and report on, management’s 
assessment of its internal controls. Because this exemption allows non-accelerated filers to 
avoid significant compliance cost, the purpose of the thesis is to provide a trend analysis of 
changing proportion of non-accelerated filers from 2002-2016 to see if companies have taken 
advantage of the exemption only applicable to non-accelerated filers. I find that there was a 
larger proportion of non-accelerated filers right before the effective date of the exemption rule 
for Section 404 (b) in 2010. In addition, I find that the proportion of companies changing from 
accelerated to non-accelerated filers is the largest right before 2010. These results are 
consistent with the notion that non-accelerated filers have the incentive to avoid the huge cost 
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On December 2nd 2001, Enron’s bankruptcy exposed the scandal of hiding real 
numbers in financial statement. Their auditor, Arthur Anderson, and as such the public lost 
confidence of auditors’ independence from their clients. Not only Enron, but other giants, 
such as WorldCom and Tyco, either collapsed or were embroiled in scandals at the same time 
and for much the same reason: fraudulent financial reporting for the sake of maintaining or 
increasing stock valuations (Wilbanks, 2016).  
In order to rebuild the confidence of the public, the US Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. “SOX was enacted to help ensure accountability of corporations 
and their accounting firms by specifying detailed financial reporting requirements and 
imposing financial penalties and criminal sanctions on those who personally participate in 
fraud” (Wilbanks, 2016).  
            The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was, no doubt, the most significant accounting and 
auditing legislation enacted in recent history. One of the major provisions of this legislation 
was the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The mission of 
PCAOB is to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation 
of informative, accurate and independent audit reports (Schroeder, 2016). Additionally, SOX 
aims to ensure auditor’s independence, hold management liable for their published results, 
govern the reporting process, and also apply sufficient internal controls that will minimize the 
possibility of material misstatement, or fraud from occurring (Jaara & Oweis, 2016).  
    Section 404 is one of main provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 404 consists of 
two parts; Section 404 (a) is for companies, stating that each annual report required by Section 




report by management. It shall state the responsibility of management for establishing and 
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting and 
contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the 
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial 
reporting. Section 404(b) requires a publicly-held company’s auditor to attest to, and report 
on, management’s assessment of its internal controls. Some experts insist that section 404 b 
could significantly improve the overall quality of internal control for public companies. While 
others believe that the expensive compliance fee is too costly for small companies, and filing 
with this rule might not worth to dong. According to a study conducted by Financial 
Executives International (FEI) in March 2005, on 217 publicly traded companies, it was 
concluded that an average of almost 26,758 extra internal labor hours were required to comply 
with SOX 404 requirements (Jaara & Oweis, 2016).  
In this study, I investigate that the proportion change for non-accelerated filer and 
accelerated filer as well as the percentage change from one filing status to another from 2002 
to 2016. I find evidence that companies tried to keep their non-accelerated filing status 
intentionally to avoid the huge cost to comply with section 404 (b). Section II is literature 
review and hypothesis development, following by section III which is the methodology and 









II. Legislative History and Literature Review 
Legislative History  
        All public companies are required to submit an annual assessment of the 
effectiveness of their internal financial auditing controls to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, but the effective dates differed depending on what category the company fell in. 
(SEC).  All Exchange Act reporting companies were divided into three categories of filers: 
large accelerated filers, accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers1 to determine the deadline 
of filing annual reports Form 10-K, quarterly reports Form 10-Q, and current reports on Form 
8-K for a number of specified events according to a variety of other disclosure requirements. 
Originally, a company can be classified into accelerated filer if it meets the following 
conditions as of the end of it fiscal year: common equity public float was $75 million or more 
as of the last business day of its most recently completed second fiscal quarter; has been 
subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act for a 
period of at least 12 calendar months; has previously filed at least one annual report pursuant 
to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act or the company is not eligible to use Forms 10-
KSB and 10-QSB (Release No. 22-8128). In addition, when complying section 404, 
companies that have public float of $700 million or more are large accelerated filers, and 









Section 404 of SOX use these criteria to distinguish companies.  On June 5, 2003, the 
commission adopted several amendments to its rules and forms implementing Section 404 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Under the compliance dates originally established, 
companies meeting the definition of an “accelerated filer” in Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 would 
have become subject to the internal control reporting requirements with respect to the first 
annual report that they filed for a fiscal year ending on or after June 15, 2003. Later, in 
February 2004, SEC extended the compliance dates for accelerated filers to fiscal years 
ending on or after November 15, 2004. 
In general, non-accelerated filers’ compliance date was extended longer than 
accelerated filers. Non-accelerated filers would not have become subject to the requirements 
until they file an annual report for a fiscal year ending on or after April, 2005 (Release No. 
33-8238). In February 2004, SEC also extended the compliance dates for non-accelerated 
filers and for foreign private issuers to fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2005 (Release 
No. 33-8392). In September 2005, SEC again extended the compliance dates for the internal 




filers. Based on the September 2005 extension, domestic and foreign non-accelerated filers 
were scheduled to comply with the internal control over financial reporting requirements 
beginning with annual reports filed for their first fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2007 
(Release No. 33-8618). In 2006, SEC published another documents that shows a chart that 
summarized the revised compliance date and final rules that will be in place after effective 
date.  
When SOX was implemented, non-accelerated filers were permitted to defer 
compliance with Section 404 (a)’s requirement to provide management’s report on the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting until their annual report filed for a 
fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2007 (Release No. 33-8618). Deferrals of the 
auditor attestation requirement under section 404 (b) have extended even longer. In October 
2009, the SEC issued what it described as the last such deferral. Non-accelerated filers would 
be required to include an auditor’s attestation report in their annual report filed for a fiscal 
year ending on or after June 15, 2010 (Release No. 33-8238). 
Finally, on July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Securities and Exchange Commission is 
adopting amendments to its rules and forms to conform them to Section 404(c) of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”), as added by Section 989G of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”). 
Section 404(c) provides that Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act shall not apply with 
respect to any audit report prepared for an issuer that is neither an accelerated filer nor a large 
accelerated filer as defined in Rule 12b-2 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 




      Despite the fact that SOX 404 has been investigated in depth by different scholars, there 
are very small number of papers that have examined the effect of exempting non-accelerated 
filers form SOX 404 (b). According to a study by Feng and Li (2011), intentionally keep 
smaller filing status will have a direct negative effect on the U. S. economy since non-
accelerated filers form the vast majority of listed companies in the U. S. financial market. 
Furthermore, it has been found that these requirements prevent emerging companies from 
going public (Feng and Li, 2011). Moreover, “some small sized companies have even 
disregarded future, or present growth opportunities, so they would avoid the compliance 
burden of SOX 404 (B)” (Feng and Li, 2009). A 2009 study by the Government 
Accountability Office (hereafter referred to as GAO) shows that complying with SOX 404 
requirements have affected manager’s behavior. Managers would prefer to take conservative 
actions in their investment decisions in order to keep their companies in the non-accelerated 
filers’ category because these managers believe that complying with SOX 404 (b) 
requirements would result in increasing the non-value adding spending in terms 
of money and time (GAO, 2009). 
 
Why the cost matters? 
Section 404(a) of the Act requires management to assess and report on the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting (“ICFR”) and Section 404(b) requires 
that an independent auditor attest to management’s assessment of the effectiveness of those 
internal controls. According to the SEC, because the cost of complying with the requirements 
of Section 404 of the Act (“Section 404”) has been generally viewed as being unexpectedly 




series of reforms in 2007 (SEC, 2009). Also, this SEC report presents an analysis of data from 
publicly traded companies collected from an SEC-sponsored Web survey of financial 
executives of companies with Section 404 experience conducted during December 2008 and 
January 2009. The analysis of the survey data is designed to inform the Commission and other 
interested parties as to whether delaying of deadlines occurring since 2007 had the intended 
effect of facilitating more cost-effective internal controls evaluations and audits, especially as 
they may apply to smaller reporting companies. The findings of the analysis relating to 
efficiency include evidence on the total and component compliance costs, the changes in costs 
over time, and the factors that help to explain why costs are lower or higher for some 
companies than for others. These findings include evidence of direct and indirect effects that 
management ascribes to Section 404 compliance, including evidence on intended benefits. As 
a result, the general conclusion from the analysis of survey data is that compliance costs vary 
with company size (increasing with size) and compliance history (decreasing with increased 
compliance experience). Larger companies tend to incur higher compliance costs in dollar 
terms (“absolute cost”), while smaller companies report higher costs as a fraction of asset 
value (“scaled cost”). The evidence suggests that companies bear some fixed start-up costs of 
compliance that are not scalable. Some of these costs are recurring fixed costs, while others 
are one-time start-up costs borne in the first years of compliance that tend to dissipate over 
time. For companies complying with both parts of Section 404, the cost of complying with 
Section 404(b) is reportedly similar to the incremental cost of complying with Section 404(a) 
alone. The resource requirements of Section 404(a) and Section 404(b) compliance are quite 




outside vendor expenses, while the Section 404(b) cost is experienced primarily through 
increased independent-auditor fees, according to the survey evidence.  
According to Holder, Karim, and Robin (2013), the concerns of small firms such as 
those belonging to the non-accelerated category are perceived as important by market 
participants. They represent a significant component of the U.S. economy. They form by far 
the largest category of public firms. For instance, in 2009, there were more than 5,000 non-
accelerated filers representing about six percent of the market capitalization of listed firms 
(SEC 2010).  “They are perceived as bearing a relatively higher burden in terms of 
compliance costs. Moreover, there are concerns that SOX provisions such as Section 404b 
were a bit of overkill for small firms (Cutler, 2006) notes that the structure of small firms is 
far less complex and the financial condition much more transparent, implying that the 
regulation is unnecessary”.  
Additionally, some small businesses argue that they could act better to remain nimble 
and competitive in the market, so that they don’t need to comply with Section 404 (b) for 
well-defined internal control process (Gao, Wu & Zimmerman, 2009). Small accelerated filers 
may be similar given the significant cost of implementing Section 404(b), it is conceivable 
that some companies close to meeting the definition of non-accelerated filers would have 
incentive to move to the category of non-accelerated filers. 
The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance has published its latest batch of guidance 
for small filers. The guidance is the result of a year of participating in public forums alongside 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and it is available on the SEC website. 
Smaller reporting companies, and particularly micro-cap companies, often lack in-house 




public companies, says Paul Chestovich, a partner with the Minneapolis- based law firm of 
Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand. Moreover, many small company executives struggle to 
find the time to learn the nuances of SEC filing. One example of life at small public company: 
Many such filers don’t have spare cash to pay executives or outside consultants, and instead 
use stock-based compensation. There’s nothing inherently wrong in that, Chestovich notes, 
but it does make SEC filing more complex.  
 
How it works? 
    Public float is the portion of a company's outstanding shares that is in the hands of public 
investors, as opposed to company officers, directors, or stockholders that hold controlling 
interests. These are the shares that are available for trading. The float is calculated by using 
the market capitalization minus the holding by affiliates. According to GAO (2009), SEC 
defines an affiliate as “an affiliate of, or person affiliated with, a specified person, is a person 
that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or 
is under common control with, the person specified”? (SEC rule 405). Although executive 
officers and directors are always considered affiliates, firms differ in how they treat block 
holders because the SEC has not established a bright-line cutoff. For example, according to 
GAO (2006), California Micro Devices Corp. considers shares held by a 5 percent owner as 
affiliated and excludes them from public float, whereas Vical Corp. counts 10 percent owners 
as affiliates, along with executive officers and directors. By expanding the cutoff line, 
companies could result more affiliated when they set the threshold as 5%, while other 




 As I mentioned in previous paragraph that public float is calculated by using market 
capacity minus the amount of holding by affiliates. Because the SEC does not prescribe a 
bright-line cutoff for affiliates, non-accelerated filers might have incentives to manipulate 
with the amount held by affiliates to keep their filing status and accelerated filers may have 
the same incentive to change to the non-accelerated filer status. In addition, because the 
exemption of Section 404(b) took effect in 2010, it is reasonable that some companies might 
predict how the rules evolved and take some measures in advance. 
I state the two hypotheses in an alternative form as follows: 
H1a: There are more accelerated filer changes to the non-accelerated filer status in the post-
2009 period. 
















III. Methodology and Results 
 
 All data are collected from the Audit Analytics from year 2002 to 2016. Below is Table 1 
regarding the descriptive statistics.   
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
As shown above, the mean of both audit fee and total fee for non-accelerated filers are 
less than that for accelerated filer. This is to be expected because accelerated filers should 
comply with section 404(b), while non-accelerated filers were exempted. Later on, I create a 
database that only contains public companies which changed their filing status during that 
period of time. As the companies grow in market capitalization, the public float should 
increase so that their filing status is more likely to change from non-accelerated filer to 
accelerated filer.  





Figure 2: Numbers of company changing from non-accelerated filer to accelerated filer 
 
Figure 2 visual presentation of Table 2.  
Figure 2 and Table 2 show how many companies change their filing status from non-
accelerated filer into accelerated filer from 2002 to 2016. I expected that there would be less 







of Section 404(b) is finalized for the non- accelerated filer at that time. As a result, my 
hypothesis is not consistent with what I have got in the table, there are definitely more non-
accelerated filers change into accelerated filer form 2009-2011. However, there was a 
decrease in the number of non-accelerated filers changing status to accelerated filers from 
2002 to 2009. The number tanked in 2009. This might be due to smaller companies 
anticipating the exemption to be taken place soon. The number of companies changing from 
NAF to AF started to increase in 2010 again. It is unclear why this is the case. 
In contrast, some business might shrink or for any other reason, their public float was 
below the threshold for accelerated filer and become non-accelerated or smaller reporting 
company. SEC have set up a stricter exit rules- companies needs to report a public float below 
50 million in order to fell into the category of non-accelerated filer (SEC 2005). 
In Figure 3 below, I trace how many companies change their filing status from accelerated 
filer to non-accelerated filer over time. 






Figure 3: Numbers of company changing from accelerated filer to non-accelerated filer 
 
Based on Table 3 and Figure 3, on average, there are about 89 companies that change 
their filing status from accelerated filers into non-accelerated filer from 2002-2007.3 Although 
the numbers fluctuate during those years, the variation is not dramatic. In year 2007, the 
number increased sharply, and that was the year when the deferral was announced by SEC. 
Moreover, there were more companies change their status into non-accelerated in year 2009. 
This trend supports our hypothesis that companies have incentives to become a non-
accelerated filer. The relationship is reversed in year 2010, which is the year that non-
accelerated filer officially exemption from Section 404 (b). 
Another test that I run is to calculate the proportion of each filing status using numbers 
in each category divided by numbers of all publicly traded companies in that period for each 
year from 2002 to 2016. Based on Audit Analytics, some companies didn’t disclose their 
filing status. When I calculate the number of all publicly traded companies, I use two 
																																																						





alternative measures. One is including those companies that didn’t disclose their filing status 
in the denominator, while the other is only counting the companies who disclose their filing 
status in the denominator.  The dilute proportion rates, which only count companies who 
disclose their filing status in the denominator, would be more accurate than the other analyses 
because we don’t know the reason why those companies didn’t disclose the status.   
Table 4 and Figure 4 below present the proportion changing for accelerated filers to 
non-accelerated filer from 2002 to 2016, including the dilute proportion rate and nominal 




Table 4: Proportion change for different filing status 
 
 








Table 4 and Figure 4 give us a general idea of how the proportion change over time 
and we can see the trend evolved over time. Generally, the dilute proportion and nominal 
proportion rate change in the same direction. In 2006, the proportion of non-accelerated filers 
reached the bottom, but it’s unclear why that might have happened. In 2009, there was a sharp 
increase in the proportion of companies changing from the accelerated to non-accelerated 
filing status. This means that before the exemption of Section 404 (b)took effect in 2010, 
more companies tried to change into the non-accelerated status in anticipation of the 








The implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted to restore investor confidence 
in the financial markets and to enhance the quality of financial of public trade companies. 
Section 404 (b) requires a publicly-held company’s auditor to attest to, and report on, 
management’s assessment of its internal controls. However, for smaller companies, the huge 
cost to comply with section 404(b) in SOX is argued to offset the benefit. This cost therefore 
incentivizes companies to remain at or switch to the NAF status. In this study, I investigate 
the trend of public companies transferring from accelerated filers into non-accelerated filers, 
and see if there are any significant changes over time. 
My findings are that there was a larger proportion of non-accelerated filers right before 
the effective date of the exemption rule for section 404 (b) in 2010. In addition, I find that the 
proportion of companies changing from accelerated to non-accelerated filers is the largest 
right before 2010. I therefore infer that non-accelerate filers tried to maintain the filing status 
to avoid the huge compliance cost for Section 404 (b). . These findings are important because 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted to ensure that public companies have a 
great internal control environment. Intentionally manipulating shares held by affiliates or 
other means to keep or move to a filing status is, perhaps, an unintended consequence of the 
Act.  
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